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The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) 
The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) at the University of 
Maryland’s School of Public Policy conducts research, education, and outreach about how 
powerful trends associated with globalization are affecting international security. It focuses on 
strategies to increase international cooperation, especially where powerful technologies—with 
both beneficial and dangerous uses—are becoming widely available to states and non-state 
actors. To learn more about CISSM, visit www.cissm.umd.edu. 
 
IranPoll 
IranPoll is an independent full-service opinion research and consultancy company headquartered 
in Toronto, Canada, focusing exclusively on Iran. A division of People Analytics Inc., IranPoll 
relies on its vast survey capacity to conduct and collect polling data from Iran using various 
modes of data collection, including a national probability sample omnibus telephone (CATI) 
survey that it runs every month. Building on the in-depth local knowledge of its team of experts, 
IranPoll solely relies on methods that could be objectively verified and independently replicated. 
Complementing its extensive field capacity, IranPoll is the developer of VoxIran.com, which is 
to date the single most comprehensive databank of Iranian opinion polls containing more than 
3,000 diverse questions on 280 topics and subtopics from more than 180 probability sample 
surveys conducted from 2006 to 2017 in Iran. Through its exclusive access to VoxIran, IranPoll 































The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) has been conducting in-
depth surveys of Iranian public opinion since the summer of 2014. When this research started, 
nuclear negotiations between Iran, the United States, and five other powers had reached an 
intensive stage. The prospects for a diplomatic resolution to international concerns about Iran’s 
nuclear program were uncertain, but they looked better than they had at any point since 2002. 
That was when information about Iran secretly building dual-use nuclear facilities became public 
and when the George W. Bush administration was preparing for war with Iraq based, in part, on 
suspicions that it was once again pursuing weapons of mass destruction. If negotiators for the 
P5+1 countries and Iran could reach agreement on terms acceptable to the lawmakers and 
citizens of each country—that would be fully implemented by all sides—then a major 
nonproliferation objective could be achieved. This would be a powerful demonstration for the 
entire world that cooperation could be more effective, at lower cost, than confrontation for 
resolving major security problems. 
 
We wanted to know what the Iranian people hoped to achieve through diplomacy and what they 
were willing to give in return. We also wanted to track how they felt about the results of the 
negotiations, and how that affected domestic politics in Iran and popular support for cooperation 
or confrontation on other international security issues. A small amount of nuclear-related public 
opinion polling had been done in Iran previously, including by some members of CISSM’s 
research team. But nobody had done systematic surveys with a broad enough set of trend-line 
questions and new questions tailored to evolving circumstances to be able to shed much light on 
these topics. 
 
What has happened since we started this project has made the core questions motivating our 
research even more important. Agreement was reached on a nuclear deal, formally known as the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in July 2015. Its terms were at the outer limits of 
what our research had indicated would be acceptable in Iran. Nevertheless, both the JCPOA and 
the political leaders responsible for it—President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister 
Mohammad Zarif—were extremely popular. Enthusiasm for the deal cooled a little as people 
gained a better understanding of the terms. Yet, hopes for improved political relations and 
economic benefits were still high in January 2016, when the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) certified that Iran had fulfilled its nuclear-related obligations and it began to 
receive relief from nuclear sanctions imposed by the United States, the European Union, and the 
United Nations.  
 
The results of Iran’s parliamentary elections in February 2016 were a resounding public 
endorsement of Rouhani, the nuclear deal, and efforts to increase Iran’s political and economic 
engagement with the rest of the world. Because sanctions relief had just begun, the Iranian 
people were not yet seeing any economic benefits. They hoped that Rouhani, backed by a 
supportive parliament, could move quickly to get results from the JCPOA that reduced 
unemployment and addressed other concerns of average Iranians. 
 
Much has changed since then, most notably in the U.S. government’s stance on the nuclear deal, 
its attitude toward Iran, and its position on multilateral cooperation in many fields. When Donald 
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Trump won the 2016 presidential election, the Iranian people expected his administration to be 
somewhat more hostile toward Iran than the Obama administration had been, but they re-elected 
Rouhani the following summer in the hope that he could keep working with all the signatories to 
the JCPOA to spur trade and investment and improve the Iranian economy. It was not clear, 
though, how Rouhani could address Trump’s main criticisms of the deal because our research 
showed that few Iranians supported changes to the JCPOA, or additional constraints on Iran’s 
missile testing and regional activities.  
 
Most of the new data in this report is from a CISSM survey fielded in mid-January 2018 in the 
midst of two major developments. In October 2017, Trump told the U.S. Congress that he was no 
longer willing to certify that continued participation in the JCPOA was in U.S. national interest, 
even though most of his top security advisors concurred with the IAEA’s findings that Iran was 
still fulfilling its nuclear obligations. This led to intensive negotiations between the United States 
and the European signatories to the JCPOA (Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union) 
to see whether Trump’s objections could be addressed in some way that did not violate Western 
commitments. Iranpoll re-asked a number of trend-line questions from the CISSM surveys in 
mid-April, and agreed to let us include its data in this report. Diplomatic efforts to keep the 
United States in the JCPOA ended on May 8, 2018, when Trump announced that the United 
States was withdrawing from the JCPOA, reinstating all U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran, 
and imposing secondary sanctions on any country that continued to buy Iranian oil, invest in 
Iran, or conduct other economic transactions.  
 
The other major development was the protests in Iran that peaked in intensity around the 
beginning of 2018. If even a small percentage of the population in a country of eighty million 
people are unhappy enough about something to take to the streets, the results can be quite 
dramatic. As the protests were growing in size and spreading across Iran, though, there were 
conflicting narratives in the West regarding what motivated the protestors, how much public 
support they had, and whether the Iranian government’s response would be seen as appropriate 
by the population at large, or as overly repressive, resulting in broader opposition. There were 
also heated debates about how increasing U.S. pressure on Iran would affect the trajectory and 
results of the protests. Would political statements and steps to reimpose economic sanctions 
intensify public pressure for more dramatic diplomatic concessions and changes to the Iranian 
political system? Or, would they cause more Iranians to blame the United States rather than their 
own government for their economic woes, to favor policies of self-sufficiency over economic 
engagement, and to doubt that diplomacy could produce mutually beneficial solutions to 
important problems? This study addresses these questions. 
 
Previous reports on Iranian public opinion done by CISSM in collaboration with the Program on 
Public Consultation and Iranpoll, along with the questionnaires and related articles, can be found 






The study is based on a telephone poll (CATI) conducted between January 16 and 24, 2018 
among a representative sample of 1,002 Iranians. The poll was conducted by IranPoll, an 
independent Toronto-based polling firm. The margin of error is +/- 3.1%.   
 
The samples were RDD samples drawn from all landline telephones in Iran. The samples were 
stratified first by Iranian provinces and then in accordance to settlement size and type. All 31 
Iranian provinces were represented in proportions similar to their actual populations, as were 
rural and urban areas.  
 
When a residence was reached, an adult was randomly selected from within that household using 
the random table technique. An initial attempt and three callbacks were made in an effort to 
complete an interview with the randomly selected respondents. The AAPOR2 contact rate of the 
survey was 76%. The AAPOR2 cooperation rate of the survey was 79%. The overall response 
rate of the survey based on AAPOR2 was 58%.  
 
More details on the survey methodology and techniques used to evaluate the quality of the data 





Summary of Findings  
 
1. More Iranians See Economy as Bad and Getting Worse [Page 9] 
Growing majorities say Iran’s economic situation is bad and getting worse. Less than a fifth now 
say the economic condition of their family has improved over the last four years. Most say 
economic mismanagement and corruption are having a greater negative impact than sanctions. 
Unemployment remains the top concern of the Iranian people. They are divided on whether the 
next generation will be better off financially than their parents are today. 
 
2. Approval of Nuclear Deal Drops as Disappointment with its Benefits Rises [Page 10] 
Enthusiasm for the JCPOA has dropped significantly. Slightly more than half approve of the 
agreement, while a third oppose it. Two years into the implementation of the deal, majorities 
believe Iran has not received most of the promised benefits and that people’s living conditions 
have not been improved by the nuclear deal. An overwhelming majority says the deal did not 
improve Iran’s relations with the United States, but are more positive about its effect on relations 
with Europe.  
 
As Rouhani’s administration steps up its efforts to defend the deal against its domestic 
opponents, public misperceptions about the terms of the deal have undergone a revival. Clear 
majorities incorrectly believe that per the agreement, all U.S. sanctions on Iran must eventually 
be lifted, and that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is not allowed to inspect 
Iranian military sites under any circumstances. Most Iranians still believe that it is important for 
Iran to develop its nuclear program, although the percentage that is very supportive has 
decreased slightly since the JCPOA was signed. 
 
3. Increasing Majority Supports Retaliation if U.S. Abrogates JCPOA [Page 14] 
Attitudes about how Iran should respond if the United States violates the JCPOA have hardened. 
A growing majority says that were the United States to abrogate the deal, Iran should retaliate by 
restarting the aspects of its nuclear program it has agreed to suspend under the JCPOA rather 
than taking the matter to the UN. A modest majority says Iran should withdraw if the United 
States withdraws, even if other P5+1 countries remain committed to the deal. Most Iranians, 
however, would support their government if it decides that remaining in the deal is in Iran’s best 
interest.  
 
4. Staunch Resistance to Renegotiating the Nuclear Deal with Trump [Page 15] 
Large majorities say that Iran should refuse to increase the duration of the special nuclear limits 
it accepted under the JCPOA or to stop developing more advanced missiles, even if the United 
States threatens to re-impose sanctions lifted under the JCPOA or offers to lift more sanctions.   
 
5. Majority Rejects Halting Development of Missiles [Page 17] 
An overwhelming majority thinks it is important for Iran to develop missiles, primarily to defend 
Iran, deter attacks, and increase Iran’s security. Large majorities say Iran should continue testing 
ballistic missiles despite U.S. demands for Iran to halt such tests. 
 
6. Views of P5+1 Countries [Page 18] 
Iranians’ views of all the P5+1 countries besides the United States have improved, and a clear 
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majority expresses confidence that these countries will uphold their end of the JCPOA. 
Majorities now regard Russia, China, Germany, and even France favorably, but retain negative 
views of the United States and Britain. For the first time, a majority now says they have an 
unfavorable view of the American people as well as of their government. A majority believes 
that Iranian relations with European countries have improved due to the deal; almost no one says 
that about the United States. Far from showing implacable hostility toward the West, a majority 
continues to think it is possible for the Islamic world and the West to find common ground, 
though the number who say conflict between the two is inevitable has increased.  
 
7. Majority Sees No Value in Negotiations; Support for Self-Sufficiency Grows [Page 21] 
Two in three say the JCPOA experience shows that it is not worthwhile to make concessions as 
part of international negotiations, because Iran cannot have confidence that world powers would 
honor their sides of an agreement. Accordingly, an increasing majority thinks Iran should strive 
to achieve economic self-sufficiency rather than focus on increasing its trade with other 
countries. Willingness to compromise and make reciprocal concessions is higher among those 
who think the nuclear deal has improved the living conditions of ordinary Iranians, as well as 
those who voice confidence that the United States will abide by its side of the agreement. 
 
8. Strong Sympathy with Complaints about Economic Policies and Corruption [Page 22] 
During late December 2017 and early January 2018, large street protests took place across Iran. 
These protests were organized by different groups of people for varying reasons. To see what 
proportion of the Iranian population sympathizes with each type of protest, this study asked 
respondents to indicate the degree to which they sympathized with each of the complaints 
voiced. Large majorities say they sympathize with complaints voiced by some protestors that the 
government should do more to keep food and gasoline prices from rising; not cut cash subsidies; 
and compensate people who lost money when some financial institutions in Iran collapsed. They 
also agree that the government is not doing enough to help the poor and farmers who are 
suffering as a result of the drought. Iranians are also almost unanimous in their demand that more 
should be done to fight financial and bureaucratic corruption in Iran.   
 
9. Majorities Disagree with Protestors who Critiqued Iran’s Domestic Political System and 
Foreign Operations [Page 24] 
Three in four disagree that Iran’s political system needs to undergo fundamental change. Two in 
three also disagree with the view that the government interferes too much in people’s personal 
lives; indeed, six in ten reject the idea that the government should not strictly enforce Islamic 
laws. As in the past, about three in four believe that when making decisions, Iranian 
policymakers should take religious teachings into account. Clear majorities also reject other 
complaints voiced by some protestors—that the military should spend much less on developing 
missiles, and that Iran’s current level of involvement in Iraq and Syria is not in Iran’s national 
interests. U.S. expressions of support for protests were generally regarded as irrelevant or 
unhelpful. 
 
10. Majority Approves of Police Handling of the Protests [Page 27] 
Two in three approve of how the police handled the protests and say they used an appropriate 
amount of force. Views about how arrested protestors should be treated depend on how they 
acted. Almost two in three think that protestors who were arrested while peacefully voicing their 
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complaints against government policies should be released. A smaller majority wants protestors 
who accidentally injured bystanders to be prosecuted, but not punished harshly. Most Iranians 
want the judiciary to prosecute protestors who chanted slogans against Islam or Iran’s system of 
government, but only a minority demand harsh punishment. About six in ten want the judiciary 
to prosecute and harshly punish those who are found guilty of attacking the police, damaging 
public property, or burning Iran’s flag. 
 
11. Media Consumption Habits [Page 29] 
Majorities follow news regarding domestic and international affairs. Domestic television, 
followed by social networking apps, such as Telegram, and the internet are the media used by a 
majority of Iranians to become informed about the news. The numbers of people relying on VOA 
and BBC news programs have declined significantly since the rise of social media in Iran.   
 
12. A Range of Views on Regional Issues [Page 30] 
About half of Iranians say their government should try to find mutually acceptable solutions to 
regional problems, and the other half say that Iran should seek to become the most powerful 
country in the region. A large majority says Iran should either increase or maintain its current 
level of support for groups fighting terrorist groups like ISIS. Most Iranians want Iran to use its 
influence in Iraq to support policies that benefit both Shiites and Sunnis, rather than policies that 
primarily benefit Shiites. Now that Iran and Russia have declared victory over ISIS in Syria, 
almost as many Iranians want to end or reduce assistance to President Bashar Assad as want to 
continue it until his government regains full control over all Syrian territory. An overwhelming 
majority reject the idea that Assad should not be allowed to remain as Syria’s president and say 
the Syrian people should decide whether he remains in office. 
 
13. General Soleimani’s Popularity Soars, while Rouhani and Zarif Slip [Page 32] 
General Qasem Soleimani’s popularity is at an all-time high, with two in three saying that they 
hold a very favorable opinion of him. He is followed in popularity by the Iranian Foreign 
Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, whose favorability rating has decreased slightly since June 
2017. President Rouhani’s popularity has dropped sharply since his victory in the May 2017 
presidential elections. Opinions of Ebrahim Raisi, Rouhani’s conservative opponent in the 
election, have held steady. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s former president, remains the most 
polarizing figure among Iranian politicians. 
 
14. Majority Sees Climate Change as a Very Serious Problem [Page 33] 
Iranians almost unanimously see global climate change as a serious issue and a majority says 
these changes are harming people around the world today. Two in three say they are very 
concerned that climate change will affect them personally. A large majority wants the 
government to do more to protect the environment, even if the economy suffers as a result. Two 
in three say they approve of Iran taking steps to significantly reduce its air pollution over the 





1. More Iranians See Economy as Bad and Getting Worse  
 
Growing majorities say Iran’s economic situation is bad and getting worse. Less than a 
fifth say the economic condition of their family has improved over the last four years. Most 
say economic mismanagement and corruption are having a greater negative impact than 
sanctions. Unemployment remains the top concern of the Iranian people. They are divided 
on whether the next generation will be better off financially than their parents are today. 
 
When asked to identify in their own words the “single most important problem or challenge that 
Iran currently faces,” more than four in five—86%—gave an answer about Iran’s economy.  
Forty percent named unemployment, and another 9% youth unemployment. Thirteen percent 
mentioned inflation and the high cost of living. Nine percent said low incomes or poverty. Six 
percent referred to financial corruption and embezzlements. And another 11% spoke more 
generally of mismanagement of the country’s affairs (6%) or its bad economic condition (5%). 
 
The public’s assessment of Iran’s 
economy has steadily grown more 
negative over the last two and a 
half years. In January 2018, seven 
in ten (69%) saw the economy as 
bad, and four in ten (41%) as very 
bad; only 30% rated it positively. 
When IranPoll re-asked the 
question three months later, 72% 
saw the economy as bad and 24% 
as good. This is in marked contrast 
to May 2015, when the nuclear 
negotiations were entering their 
last phase: At that time a modest 
majority of 54% were positive about the economy, perhaps taking a glass-half-full view of its 
prospects (somewhat good, 43%).   
 
For the first time in recent years, 
when asked whether the economy 
is improving or worsening, a 
substantial majority (58%) said the 
economy is getting worse; only 
31% said it is getting better. Since 
December 2016, approximately 
half have said the economy is 
worsening. The proportion of 
pessimists had nearly reached three 
out of five Iranians by January 
2018. It had surpassed two out of 
three by April 2018, when IranPoll 
asked the same question again.  
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In your opinion, how good or bad is our country's 
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Right now, do you think economic conditions in Iran, 




In January 2018, less than a fifth (only 17%) said that their family’s economic condition had 
improved over the last four years—a 6-point drop since May 2017. Those saying their family’s 
conditions have deteriorated have held steady at 41%, but the number saying they are treading 
water has risen. Those saying their family’s condition “has remained unchanged” was 41%, up 
from 36%.  
 
Iranians were more likely to blame their own leaders than foreign pressures for the economic 
problems in Iran. Asked which has the greatest negative impact on the Iranian economy, 63% 
picked “domestic economic mismanagement and corruption” over “foreign sanctions and 
pressures” (32%).  The percentage blaming domestic factors was statistically unchanged since 
May 2015, when this question was last asked. The percentage blaming foreign sanctions and 
pressures had risen from 26% to 32%, while “don’t know” responses declined. These shifts are 
noteworthy because many sanctions had been officially lifted in January 2016 after Iran had 
fulfilled the nuclear commitments it made in the JCPOA. As we will see below, a large majority 
of Iranians say that they have yet to see any benefits from sanctions relief and hold the United 
States responsible. Although pressure from outside seemed more salient to Iranians in January 
2018 than it did in May 2015—when negotiations were culminating toward the nuclear deal—it 
was still overshadowed for most by internal issues. The U.S. decision to leave the JCPOA and 
reimpose sanctions on Iran may well have helped Iran’s leaders shift the locus of blame towards 
external factors.  
 
Despite current economic 
frustrations, when asked to think 
longer term, about half summon 
some optimism. Asked “When 
children today in Iran grow up, do 
you think they will be better off or 
worse off financially than their 
parents?” 49% thought the children 
would be better off, while 43% 
said “worse off.” 
  
 
2. Approval of Nuclear Deal Drops as Disappointment with its Benefits Rises 
 
Enthusiasm for the JCPOA has dropped significantly. Slightly more than half approve of 
the agreement, while a third oppose it. Two years into the implementation of the deal, 
majorities believe that Iran has not received most of the promised benefits and that 
people’s living conditions have not been improved by the nuclear deal. An overwhelming 
majority says the deal did not improve Iran’s relations with the United States, but are more 
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As Rouhani’s administration stepped up its efforts to defend the deal against its critics, public 
misperceptions about its terms underwent a revival. As was the case when Rouhani was trying to 
get the JCPOA through Iran’s domestic approval process, clear majorities once again incorrectly 
believed that per the agreement, all U.S. sanctions on Iran must eventually be lifted, and that the 
IAEA is not allowed to inspect Iranian military sites under any circumstances.  
 
The public’s support for the nuclear 
agreement declined again shortly 
after Rouhani’s re-election in May 
2017. It had dropped to a modest 
majority (55%) by January 2018, 
and only 26% still approved 
strongly. Levels of approval have 
been this low only once before, in 
December 2016. At all other times 
this question was asked (including 
at the time of Rouhani’s reelection) 
support was three in five or more.  
Thirty-four percent disapproved of 
the deal in January 2018, and those 
saying “don’t know” had gone back 
up to 11%—suggesting growing 
uncertainty about the value of the 
deal. When IranPoll re-asked this question in April 2018, it found further slippage: 52% 
approval—19% strongly.    
 
The consensus view among Iranians is that the JCPOA has brought no benefits to the population 
at large. Three in four (75%) said “people’s living conditions have not improved” as a result of 
the JCPOA. This assessment has not changed significantly since June 2016. When asked about 
this in more detail, fully half (53%) said Iran simply “has not received most of the promised 
benefits.” Among the remainder, one in five (19%) indicated that “Iran has received most of the 
promised benefits, but they are making life better only for Iranians with special connections.”  
About one in ten (12%) responded that Iran had received most of the benefits, but they are being 
spent abroad—“they are mostly being used to pay for the costs of Iran’s military and foreign 
allies.” (This view is not growing; since December 2016 it has dropped three points.)  A 
miniscule 6% believed that Iran is receiving the benefits and “they are making life better for 
average Iranians.” 
 
On relations with the United States, a majority has said for some time that the JCPOA has 
brought no improvements, but the size of this majority took a sudden leap—from 57% in May 
2017 to 83% in January 2018. Only 6% said there has been any improvement in relations—down 
from 26% in May 2017. A year ago, there was a current of opinion that included one in four 
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Many more Iranians say that the JCPOA has improved relations with European countries, 
although enthusiasm has slipped some there, too.  From the start to the end of 2016, the size of 
the majority who indicated the JCPOA had brought better relations declined from 66% to 54%.  
Opinion was divided for the first time in January 2018—45% to 45%. (Interestingly, though, 
favorability ratings on specific European countries have not suffered, and some have risen—see 
section 6 below.) 
 
The percentage of Iranians who say 
that European countries “are 
moving slower than they could” to 
trade and invest with Iran crept up 
from 70% in December 2016 to 
73% in January 2018 and 78% 
when re-asked by IranPoll in April. 
Most of those who thought so in 
January (83%) explained it as a 
result of pressures from the United 
States rather than Iran’s own weak 
business environment (13%). A 
majority (58%) answered that their 
government was trying to make 
Iran’s business environment more 
appealing to foreign businesses and 
investors, and an even larger majority (87%) supported the government taking such actions. 
 
Return of Misperceptions about JCPOA 
 
As Rouhani’s administration stepped up its efforts to defend the deal against critics, public 
misperceptions about the terms of the deal underwent a revival.  This may have been due in part 
to the public hearing the administration’s arguments that while the deal’s terms were excellent 
for Iran, the United States had not fulfilled its end of the bargain and had blocked economic 
follow-through from other Western countries. In the current study, 63% said that they believed 
all U.S. sanctions were to be lifted under the deal, while only 24% knew correctly that “some 
U.S. sanctions on Iran are to be lifted, but many U.S. sanctions are not covered by the agreement 
and will continue” (6% thought no U.S. sanctions were to be lifted). These proportions are 
strikingly similar to those in 2015. In January 2016, shortly before sanctions relief took effect, 
four in ten had an accurate understanding of the deal’s terms about that topic, but 
misunderstandings have reverted to earlier levels. 
 
A different majority misperception has been quite stable: the belief that under no conditions can 
the IAEA inspect an Iranian military site. Only 23% said correctly that the IAEA “can perform 
limited inspections on military sites under specific conditions,” while a 63% majority still 
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Are European countries moving as rapidly as they 
can to trade and invest with Iran now that some 




Value Placed on Nuclear Program by Public 
 
As in the past, a very large 
majority regards Iran’s nuclear 
program as important for the 
country. Three in four (75%) said it 
is very important for Iran to 
develop its nuclear program, a ten-
point drop since the JCPOA was 
signed. Another 11% called it 
somewhat important; only 10% 
thought it unimportant. 
 
The 86% who viewed the nuclear 
program as important were asked 
to explain why in their own words.  
A little under half (47%) cited 
scientific and technological reasons (29%), or said the nuclear program could help Iran’s 
economic development (18%). Another 30% gave reasons related to Iran’s security, military 
strength, and self-sufficiency. Fifteen percent answered more generally that Iran needed a 
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How important is it for our country to 
develop its nuclear program? Is it: 















To be able to advance in scientific areas
To increase Iran’s power
To become more technologically advanced
In order not to fall behind other countries
To use instead of fossil fuels
To defend Iran against its enemies
For the advancement of the country in general
To be able to advance in economic areas
To increase Iran’s independence and self-sufficiency
To increase Iran’s security
To increase Iran’s military strength
Because we have a right to nuclear energy
Other
DK/NA
Why do you think it is important for our country to develop its 




3. Increasing Majority Supports Retaliation if U.S. Abrogates JCPOA  
 
Attitudes about how Iran should respond if the United States violates the JCPOA have 
hardened. A growing majority say that were the United States to abrogate the deal, Iran 
should retaliate by restarting the aspects of its nuclear program it agreed to suspend under 
the JCPOA rather than taking the matter to the UN. A modest majority say Iran should 
withdraw if the United States withdraws, even if other P5+1 countries remain committed to 
the deal. Most Iranians, however, would support their government if it decides that 
remaining in the deal is in Iran’s best interest.  
 
Six in ten (59%) said that if the United 
States “takes measures against Iran that are 
in violation of the JCPOA agreement,” Iran 
should restart aspects of its nuclear 
program that it agreed to suspend. When 
re-asked by IranPoll in April, this majority 
had risen to 67%. This view was up from 
55% in June 2017 and 48% in December 
2016.  Only four in ten said in January that 
Iran should continue to abide by the 
agreement while taking the issue to the UN. 
That number had been in the 38% to 43% 
range since we first asked the question.  
When re-asked by IranPoll in April, 
though, it had dropped significantly to 
31%. Those who didn’t know or proffered 
their own response were 12% to 13% of the sample earlier. This total dropped sharply to 3%-4% 
after May 2017, which suggests a hardening of views on the question.  
 
Presented with a scenario in which the United States withdraws from the JCPOA, more than half 
thought Iran should leave the agreement, too.  Respondents were offered the following: 
 
If the United States decides to withdraw from the JCPOA agreement and reimpose sanctions on Iran, but other 
P5+1 countries remain committed to the agreement and do not reimpose sanctions, what do you think Iran 
should do?  
 
In this context, 53% thought Iran should withdraw, while 39% thought it should stay committed.  
When the next question asked those who wanted to withdraw how they would feel if the Iranian 
“government were to decide to remain committed to the JCPOA so long as the other P5+1 
countries fulfill their commitment,” a 56% majority said they would support such a government 
decision, though only 20% said they would support it strongly. Forty-four percent said they 



















Iran should retaliate 
Iran should continue to live by the JCPOA 
If the United States takes measures against 
Iran that are in violation of the JCPOA 
agreement, do you think:
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4. Staunch Resistance to Renegotiating the Nuclear Deal with Trump  
 
Large majorities say Iran should refuse to lengthen the special nuclear limits it accepted 
under the JCPOA or stop developing more advanced missiles, even if the United States 
threatens to re-impose sanctions lifted under the JCPOA or offers to lift more sanctions.   
 
Asked what Iran’s response should 
be “if Trump threatens to re-
impose U.S. sanctions lifted under 
the JCPOA unless Iran agrees to 
increase the duration of the nuclear 
limits it has accepted,” 64% said 
Iran should not agree to increase 
these limits “under any 
circumstances.” Twenty-seven 
percent wanted the bargaining 
option, in which Iran might 
increase these limits as part of a 
deal that would include the lifting 
of more U.S. sanctions.   
 
A larger majority of seven in ten 
(70%) is similarly unwilling to try 
a bargain in which Iran’s ballistic 
missile development would stop in 
exchange for more US sanctions 
being lifted. “If Trump threatens to 
re-impose US sanctions lifted 
under the JCPOA unless Iran 
agrees to stop developing advanced 
missiles,” 70% said Iran should not 
accept his demand. Twenty-four 
percent wanted the bargaining 
option. In both questions, only 1% 
to 2% wanted Iran to accept the 
hypothetical demand from Trump. 
 
Are Any Iranian Subgroups Open to Renegotiating the Deal?  
 
While overall majorities of respondents were clearly unfavorable to renegotiating elements of the 
JCPOA, now that the Trump administration has withdrawn from the deal, the question arises 
whether some subgroup of Iranians feels differently and would be open to a new negotiation. To 
consider this possibility, we examined the level of support for re-negotiation just among those 
respondents who seemed most favorable toward Trump and most critical of their own regime and 
its actions that Trump wants to stop. 
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What should be Iran’s response if Trump threatens to re-
impose U.S. sanctions lifted under the JCPOA unless Iran 
agrees to stop developing advanced missiles?  
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First, the views of the 13% of respondents who rated President Trump’s policies toward 
Iran as “neither hostile nor friendly” (11%) or “friendly” (2%) were examined: 
 
• On increasing the duration of the nuclear limits Iran accepted in the deal, 53% of this 
subgroup was willing to negotiate, but only as part of a deal in which the U.S. would lift 
more sanctions on Iran. Four in ten (39%) of the subgroup was unwilling to renegotiate. 
 
• On stopping development of advanced missiles, this subgroup was divided, with 45% willing 
to bargain in exchange for the U.S. lifting more sanctions, and 45% thinking Iran should 
simply not agree to stop development. 
 
Seeking a more sympathetic subgroup, the views of the 16% who said they agreed that 
“Iran’s political system needs to undergo fundamental change” were tested: 
 
• On increasing the duration of the nuclear limits Iran accepted in the deal, 51% of this 
subgroup was unwilling to renegotiate, while 39% thought this might be done as part of a 
deal in which the U.S. would lift more sanctions. 
 
• On stopping development of advanced missiles, 52% of this subgroup thought Iran should 
continue development in any case, while 40% was willing to bargain in exchange for more 
sanctions being lifted. 
 
Finally we examined the views of the 26% that agreed with the proposition that “the 
military should spend much less money on developing missiles”: 
 
• On increasing the duration of the nuclear limits Iran accepted in the deal, 53% of this 
subgroup was unwilling to renegotiate, while 39% thought this might be done as part of a 
deal in which the U.S. would lift more sanctions. 
 
• On stopping development of advanced missiles, 55% of this subgroup said Iran should 
simply continue development if President Trump threatens to reimpose sanctions. Thirty-six 
percent were willing to bargain if the U.S. would lift more sanctions than those lifted under 
the nuclear deal. 
 
In short, it would be difficult to find a sympathetic minority of Iranians who would be supportive 






5. Majority Rejects Halting Development of Missiles  
 
An overwhelming majority thinks it is important for Iran to develop missiles, primarily to 
defend Iran, deter attacks, and increase Iran’s security. Large majorities say Iran should 
continue testing ballistic missiles despite U.S. demands for Iran to halt such tests.  
 
Asked “How important is it for your 
country to develop missiles?” 74% 
called it very important; another 21% 
said it was somewhat important.  Only 
4% said it was not very important or 
not important at all. 
 
Those who called missile 
development important were asked 
why they thought so.  A 58% majority 
gave a defense-oriented answer, 
implying that they thought an attack 
on Iran is a real possibility. Within 
this majority, 33% of the full sample said the program was important to defend Iran against its 
enemies; 16%, to deter others from attacking Iran; and another 10%, to defend Iran in case of a 
Why is it important to develop … Nuclear Program Missiles 
To be able to advance in scientific areas 17.4%  
To increase Iran’s power 13.1 3.9 
To become more technologically advanced 11.6  
In order not to fall behind other countries 8.7 3.2 
To use instead of fossil fuels 7.7  
Because we have a right to nuclear energy 1.7  
For the advancement of the country in general 6.3  
To be able to advance in economic areas 5.5  
To increase Iran’s independence and self-sufficiency 4.4  
    
To maintain/increase Iran’s security 4.3 14.8% 
To defend Iran 6.7 42.4 
To increase Iran’s military strength 1.9 8.4 
To deter others from attacking Iran  16.3 
To counter threats from US/Israel  6.9 
    
Other 5.1 .4 
DK/NA 6.2 3.6 
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In your opinion, how important is it for our 
country to develop missiles? 
Very important/Somewhat important
Not very important/Not important at all
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war. Beyond this group, another 7% named the United States or Israel as a source of threats that 
had to be countered.  
 
Thus, while the overall level of Iranian public support for missile development is comparable to 
the strong support for Iran’s nuclear program, the reasons are quite different. 
 
Four in ten (39%) said Iran should try to accommodate international concerns about the nature of 
Iran’s ballistic missile program in some way. Offered three alternative courses of action, a clear 
majority (57%) said “Iran should continue testing ballistic missiles and insist this issue is not 
negotiable.” Twenty-nine percent said Iran should continue testing, but offer to negotiate “on 
ways Iran could create confidence that the missiles are not produced to carry nuclear weapons.” 
Another 11% thought Iran should stop testing until such confidence is in place. These results are 
essentially unchanged from June 2017. 
 
 
6. Views of P5+1 Countries   
 
Iranians’ views of all the P5+1 countries besides the United States have improved, and a 
clear majority expresses confidence that these countries will uphold their end of the 
JCPOA. Majorities now regard Russia, China, Germany, and even France favorably, but 
retain negative views of the United States and Britain. For the first time, a majority now 
says they have an unfavorable view of the American people as well as of their government. 
A majority believes that Iranian relations with European countries have improved due to 
the deal; almost no one says that about the United States. Far from showing implacable 
hostility toward the West, a majority continues to think it is possible for the Islamic world 
and the West to find common ground, though the number who say conflict between the two 
is inevitable has increased.  
 
The majorities viewing Russia and China favorably have remained stable since December 2016, 
while positive views of all the other P5+1 countries except the United States have grown notably.  
This is even true for Britain, which has been viewed negatively by most Iranians for many years. 
A modest majority is favorable toward the United Nations—and this also is unusual. Views of 
the United States have declined from an already low level.  
 
Russia. Three in five (59%) had a 
favorable view of Russia, up from 56% 
in December 2016—however, only a 
modest 19% viewed Russia very 
favorably. Slimmer majorities have 
been favorable toward Russia since 
mid-2015. Russia was viewed 
negatively by thirty-eight percent (very 
unfavorable, 23%). 
 
China. China was viewed favorably by 
fifty-four percent (15%, very). Modest 
51
43
52 57 54 56 59
47
53







What is your opinion of Russia?
Iranian	Public	Opinion	After	the	Protests																																																			 19	
	
majorities have tended to see China favorably since mid-2014. However, the 43% minority that 
is negative toward China includes 29% with a very unfavorable view.   
 
Germany. Germany was viewed 
positively by over three in five 
(62%; 23%, very). This attitude has 
continued its ascent since mid-
2014.  Strikingly, positive views 
are up 10 points compared to 
December 2016. About a third 
(35%) were unfavorable toward 
Germany. 
 
France. Those with favorable 
views of France grew to a clear 
majority for the first time since at 
least 2014. Fifty-six percent were favorable—up a startling 15 points compared to December 
2016. Forty-one percent viewed France negatively, but only 21% were very unfavorable—
another striking change, since this group has regularly stayed in the 29%-35% range. 
 
Britain. The thaw noted above toward European countries has extended even to Britain, albeit 
this is still a minority position. Thirty percent viewed Britain favorably, up 7 points since 
December 2016.  More tellingly, only 44% expressed a very unfavorable view, a low for the last 
four years. 
 
United Nations. Views of the UN are in harmony with the warming trend noted above; a modest 
majority (52%) has a favorable view of the UN, something uncommon in past polling. Negative 
views of the UN were at 43% (23% very unfavorable). 
 
These shifts toward a more positive view of countries like Britain and France that Iranians often 
view unfavorably may be partly due to the fact that these countries were clearly trying to protect 
the JCPOA in January 2018. Trump was simultaneously signaling that the United States would 
withdraw unless the European countries pressured Iran into extending the duration of the nuclear 
deal, stopping ballistic missile development, and changing regional behavior. 
 
United States. Favorable views of the United States have fallen to 18%—down from 23% in 
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long been in the majority, they have now risen to two thirds (67%).   For the first time ever, a 
majority of Iranians said they have an unfavorable view of the American people. Fifty-five 
percent were unfavorable (36% very), up 9 points from June 2016.  Customarily, Iranian 
majorities have expressed negative views of the United States and the U.S. government, but 
viewed the American people more 
positively. This pattern has now 
broken. 
 
When asked to rate “the U.S. 
president’s policies toward Iran” 
on a 0-to-10 scale, with 0 meaning 
completely hostile and 10 meaning 
completely friendly, the mean 
score was 1.1, with 69% giving a 
zero.  
 
P5+1 Countries and the Nuclear 
Deal  
 
Iranians are almost unanimous in saying that general relations with the United States have not 
improved as a result of the nuclear deal. Eighty-three percent said Iran-U.S. relations have not 
improved (up from 57% in May 2017), and another 8% volunteered that relations have 
worsened. For European countries, though, 56% felt there has been some improvement, while 
35% disagreed. Still, those saying Iran-European relations have not improved have grown 20 
points since January 2016. 
 
There was a corresponding contrast in Iranians’ confidence that the United States would fulfill its 
side of the deal, and their confidence in the other P5+1 countries. Eighty-six percent were not 
very confident (23%) or not at all confident (64%) in January “that the United States will live up 
to its obligations toward the nuclear agreement.” Not surprisingly, confidence continued to 
decline as it looked increasingly likely that the Trump administration would withdraw from the 
JCPOA and re-impose nuclear sanctions on Iran. When re-asked by IranPoll in April, 92% 
expressed low confidence.  
 
In sharp contrast, 60% were at 
least somewhat confident in 
January 2018 that the other P5+1 
countries would keep their 
commitments; 36% were not 
confident (not at all, 13%). These 
attitudes have remained fairly 
stable since June 2016. When 
IranPoll re-asked the question in 
April, it found 54% confident, a 
dip from January 2018 to a level 
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7. Majority Sees No Value in Negotiations; Support for Self-Sufficiency Grows 
 
Two in three say the JCPOA experience shows that it is not worthwhile for Iran to make 
concessions as part of international negotiations, because Iran cannot have confidence that 
world powers would honor their side of an agreement. Accordingly, an increasing majority 
thinks Iran should strive to achieve economic self-sufficiency rather than focus on 
increasing its trade with other countries. Willingness to compromise and make reciprocal 
concessions is higher among those who think the nuclear deal has improved the living 
conditions of ordinary Iranians, as well as those who voice confidence that the United 
States will abide by its side of the agreement.   
 
Disappointing results from the JCPOA and a lack of confidence in the United States’ willingness 
to fulfill its end of that bargain have led two out of three Iranians to conclude that they should 
not expect much from future negotiations. Respondents were asked to think “about how the 
JCPOA has worked out so far” and to choose between two statements: 
 
The JCPOA experience shows that it is worthwhile for Iran to make concessions because through compromise 




The JCPOA experience shows that it is not worthwhile for Iran to make concessions, because Iran cannot have 
confidence that if it makes a concession world powers will honor their side of an agreement. 
 
A clear two thirds (67%) chose the second statement, while about a fifth (22%) chose the first. 
Eleven percent declined to answer, suggesting they were unwilling to make a judgment with the 
fate of the JCPOA still unknown.  
 
Accordingly, an increasing majority 
thinks Iran should strive to achieve 
economic self-sufficiency rather 
than focus on increasing its trade 
with other countries. Asked to 
assume “our country could only 
adopt one of these policies,” two 
thirds (67%) chose striving for self-
sufficiency, and one in three (29%) 
chose striving for increased trade.  
While the idea of self-sufficiency 
has been endorsed by a majority in 
this question since July 2014, this 
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Willingness to compromise and 
make reciprocal concessions is 
higher among those who think the 
nuclear deal has improved the 
living conditions of ordinary 
Iranians, as well as those who 
voice confidence that the United 
States will abide by its side of the 
agreement. Those thinking 
conditions have improved a lot 
were 21 points more likely than 
those thinking they have “not 
improved at all” to believe that if 
Iran makes concessions, 
negotiating partners will 
reciprocate. Similarly, those very 
confident in U.S. commitments under the agreement were 21 points more likely than those with 
no confidence at all to say concessions can be worthwhile. And strikingly, those very confident 
in the U.S. commitment were 39 points more likely than those with no confidence to prefer 
greater international trade over greater self-sufficiency. 
 
Far from showing implacable hostility toward the West, a majority continues to think it is 
possible for the Islamic world and the West to find common ground, though the number of those 
who say conflict between the two is inevitable has increased. Given a choice between two 
statements, 58% chose: “Most people in the West and the Islamic world have similar needs and 
wants, so it is possible to find common ground for peaceful coexistence.” About a third (35%) 
instead chose: “Islamic and Western religious and social traditions are incompatible with each 




8. Strong Sympathy with Complaints about Economic Policies and 
Corruption  
 
During late December 2017 and early January 2018, large street protests took place across 
Iran. These protests were organized by different groups of people for varying reasons. To 
see what proportion of the Iranian population sympathizes with each type of protest, this 
study asked respondents to indicate the degree to which they sympathized with each of the 
complaints voiced. Large majorities say they sympathize with complaints voiced by some 
protestors that the government should do more to keep food and gasoline prices from 
rising; not cut cash subsidies; and compensate people who lost money when financial 
institutions in Iran collapsed. They also agree that the government is not doing enough to 
help the poor, and farmers who are suffering as a result of the drought.  Iranians are 
almost unanimous in their demand that more should be done to fight financial and 
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The public’s view that “financial 
and bureaucratic corruption” 
should be fought more vigorously 
by the government is practically 
unanimous, and on a level of 
intensity with the attitude toward 
food prices described below.  
Ninety-six percent (85%, strongly) 
agreed that the government should 
do more to fight corruption. 
 
The breadth of support for this 
complaint is not surprising, since 
leading political figures frequently 
accuse their political opponents of corruption. Respondents to this survey who said they voted 
for President Rouhani in the 2017 election were only slightly less likely to express strong 
agreement with the anti-corruption message (84%) compared to those who voted for his main 
rival, Seyyed Ebrahim Raisi (87%). A survey shortly after the election found that nineteen 
percent of Raisi voters cited his honesty and ability to fight corruption as their main reason for 




Very large majorities say they agree with multiple economic complaints that were voiced during 
the protests. The widest consensus regards food prices: 95% agreed “the government should do 
more to keep the price of food 
products from increasing,” with 
four in five (81%) agreeing 
strongly. Next came the price of 
gasoline, long-subsidized in Iran: 
86% agreed that the government 
should not increase the price (73% 
strongly). Attitudes toward direct 
cash subsidies to people with poor 
or modest incomes—originally 
introduced under Ahmadinejad to 
substitute for some price controls—
are similar: 85% agreed that cash 
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A second set of economic 
complaints are also endorsed by 
large majorities, but less forcefully.  
Four in five (81%) agree that “the 
government should compensate 
people who lost money when some 
financial institutions failed,” 
though less than half (46%) feel 
this strongly. 
 
More generally, almost three in 
four agree that “the government is 
not doing enough” to help either 
the poor (73%; 43%, strongly) or 
“farmers who are suffering due to 
the drought” (70%; 45%, strongly). 
 
The small group of Iranians who think that their country’s economic situation is very good differ 
from those who say it is very bad regarding their level of sympathy with some economic 
complaints, but not others. For example, 64% of the economic optimists strongly agree that the 
government should do more to fight corruption, while 93% of the pessimists hold that view. 
Likewise, only 28% of the former sympathize with calls for the government to do more for the 
poor, while 61% of the latter endorse that position. By contrast, the gap on gas prices is much 
smaller, with 72% of the economic optimists and 77% of the pessimists saying that the 
government should not raise them. 
 
 
9. Majorities Disagree with Protestors Who Critiqued Iran’s Domestic 
Political System and Foreign Operations 
 
Three in four disagree that Iran’s political system needs to undergo fundamental change. 
Two in three also disagree with the view that the government interferes too much in 
people’s personal lives; indeed, six in ten reject the idea that the government should not 
strictly enforce Islamic laws. As in the past, about three in four believe that when making 
decisions, Iranian policymakers should take religious teachings into account. Clear 
majorities also reject other complaints voiced by some protestors—that the military should 
spend much less on developing missiles, and that Iran’s current level of involvement in Iraq 
and Syria is not in Iran’s national interests.  U.S. expressions of support for protests were 
generally regarded as irrelevant or unhelpful. 
 
Respondents were offered several of the political complaints raised by some of the protestors, 
along with the economically focused complaints listed above. In contrast with the resonance the 
public feels with protestors’ economic complaints, the political complaints voiced by some of the 
protestors got no majority endorsements. The one that did best concerned Iran’s spending in 
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Political System and Governance 
 
Asked whether they agree with the 
complaint that “Iran’s political 
system needs to undergo 
fundamental change,” over three in 
four disagreed (77%) with a 
majority doing so strongly (54%).   
 
Regardless of how we subdivided 
the data, the percentage of 
respondents who strongly agreed 
with calls for fundamental political 
change never rose above 10%. It 
was 4 percent among those who 
voted in the last election and 8% 
among those who did not vote. 
Those who voted for Rouhani were slightly more likely to agree with the need for change (5%, 
very; 14%, somewhat) compared with those who supported Raisi (2%, very; 10%, somewhat). 
Presumably, though, most Rouhani voters want to see different types of political changes than 
most Raisi voters do. 
 
A substantial, if lesser, majority (67%) did not agree that “the government interferes too much in 
people’s personal lives” (30%, strongly), and 59% did not accept the idea that “the government 
should not be strict in enforcing Islamic laws” (33%, strongly). A desire for the government to be 
less strict in enforcing Islamic laws was the protest complaint that got substantially more support 
from Iranians under 30 (42%, agreeing; 27%, strongly) than from the population as a whole. Men 
were slightly more likely than women to agree with both of these complaints.  
 
As has been the case for many years, a substantial majority believes that policymakers “should 
take religious teachings into account,” at least somewhat, when they make decisions (77%; 47%, 
“a lot”). 
 
Military Activity: Missiles, Iraq and Syria 
 
Some protestors raised issues about Iran’s 
development of ballistic missiles and its 
involvement in the region, saying that 
these were resources that could be spent 
on domestic problems. 
 
In the survey, about two in three (65%) 
disagreed that “the military should spend 
much less money on developing missiles” 
(39%, strongly), while 26% agreed.  
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proposition that “the government should spend less money in places like Syria and Iraq”; only a 
bare majority (51%) disagreed, while 42% agreed (22%, strongly).  However, when asked 
whether Iran’s level of involvement in Syria and Iraq was in the country’s national interests, 
three in five (61%) disagreed, while a third (33%) agreed. 
 
Those who think that the country’s economic conditions are very good were consistently less 
likely to agree with protestors’ criticisms of Iran’s military activity than were those who think it 
is very bad. Only 8% of the optimists strongly agreed with calls to spend less money in Syria, 
compared with a third of the pessimists. None of the optimists strongly agreed that Iran’s current 
level of involvement in Syria was not in its national interest, compared with 29% of the 
pessimists. The gap between these two groups was much smaller on funding for missile 
development, with 4% of optimists compared with 11% of pessimists strongly agreeing that the 
military should spend less.  
 
Political preferences have some effect on attitudes about military activities, but the differences 
are not huge. On funding for Syria, 47% of Rouhani voters expressed sympathy with the 
complaint compared with 26% of Raisi voters. On involvement in Syria, 36% of Rouhani voters 
agreed with the complaint, while 20% of Raisi voters did. And 30% of Rouhani voters backed 
calls to reduce spending on missile development, while only 15% of Raisi voters did. 
 
Iranians under 30 years old were slightly less likely than the population as a whole to strongly 
agree that the government was spending too much in Syria (18%) and on missile development 
(5%). Iranians who listened to foreign news, on the other hand, were much more likely to 
strongly agree with complaints about funding for and involvement in Syria (36% and 32%, 
respectively) than those who did not listen to BBC or VOA (17% and 12%, respectively). The 
gap between these two groups on funding for missile development was much smaller) 13% and 
8%, respectively. 
 
Attitudes toward U.S. expressions of support  
 
President Trump and other American 
officials expressed support for the 
Iranian protests in terms suggesting that 
the people of Iran were deeply unhappy 
with their political system and their 
leaders’ military activities, rather than 
primarily concerned about economic 
issues. 
 
When respondents were directly asked 
about Trump’s support, many seemed 
to regard it as irrelevant. Reminded that 
“a number of U.S. officials, including 
President Donald Trump, expressed 
their support for the protestors,” 
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statements “mostly help, mostly hurt, or have no effect on advancing the demands of protestors.” 
Almost half (48%) said the statements had no effect. Four in ten (39%) thought such support hurt 
the protestors; only 9% thought they helped. Respondents who listened to foreign news 
broadcasts were less likely than those who did not to view Trump’s remarks as helpful (5.3% vs. 
10.4%). 
 
This result is similar to Iranians’ views of outside interventions on human rights issues. In June 
2017 respondents were asked about the effects of human rights sanctions imposed by the U.S. 
and European countries. A bare majority (52%) said such sanctions had no effect on human 
rights in Iran, while 36% felt they had done more to hurt the human rights situation. 
 
 
10. Majority Approves of Police Handling of the Protests 
 
Two in three approve of how the police handled the protests and say they used an 
appropriate amount of force. Views about how arrested protestors should be treated 
depend on how they acted. Almost two in three think that protestors who were arrested 
while peacefully voicing their complaints against government policies should be released. A 
smaller majority wants protestors who accidentally injured bystanders to be prosecuted, 
but not punished harshly. Most Iranians want the judiciary to prosecute protestors who 
chanted slogans against Islam or Iran’s system of government, but only a minority demand 
harsh punishment. About six in ten want the judiciary to prosecute and harshly punish 
those who are found guilty of attacking the police, damaging public property, or burning 
Iran’s flag. 
 
This study asked how Iranians viewed the police and courts’ reaction to the wave of protests.  
About two thirds (66%) thought that, overall, the police handled the protests at least somewhat 
well (very well, 35%). About a quarter (24%) said the police performed badly (very badly, 12%).  
More strikingly, 64% thought the police used an appropriate amount of force, while the 
remainder was divided almost evenly between those who thought there had been too much force 
(14%) or too little (11%). 
 
Respondents were also asked about the judiciary and how judges should treat protestors who 
were arrested for infractions. They were first told: 
 
As you know, a number of people were arrested during the protests by the police and the judiciary is thinking 
about releasing some of those who were arrested. I will now read you some categories of people who were 
arrested. As I read each, please tell whether in general you think most of them should be released, most of them 
should be prosecuted, but not punished harshly, or most should be prosecuted and punished harshly if found 
guilty. 
 
The public made distinctions among the varied forms of protest that were seen during this period. 
A two-thirds majority—65%—wanted those demonstrating peacefully by “chanting slogans 
against government policies” to be released; this probably including the bulk of those who 
participated. Another 27% said they should not be punished harshly, and only 4% said they 




Another category seen as deserving leniency were “protestors who accidentally caused injury to 
bystanders.” A 57% majority said most should be prosecuted but not punished harshly, and 
another 19% said they should be released. A fifth (20%) said they should be punished harshly. 
 
Peaceful demonstrators chanting 
“slogans against Iran’s political 
system” (not just government 
policies) were also viewed fairly 
tolerantly by most Iranians.  Four 
in ten (40%) thought most should 
be prosecuted but not punished 
harshly, while another 26% said 
they should be released.   Over a 
quarter (28%), however, said they 
should be punished harshly. 
Attitudes were similar toward 
“peaceful protestors chanting 
slogans against Islam or religious 
laws.” Four in ten (42%) also 
thought they should be prosecuted 
but not harshly punished, and 
another fifth (20%) thought they 
should be released.  About a third 
(32%) preferred harsh punishment. 
 
Majorities supported harsh punishments for protestors who engaged in three types of activities: 
Those who “damaged public property” deserved harsh punishment in the eyes of three out of five 
(60%), and another third (34%) thought they should at least be prosecuted. Only 3% thought they 
should be released. “Protestors who attacked the police” got a similar reaction: 64% of Iranians 
wanted harsh punishment, 26% at least prosecutions (should release, 6%). Protestors who burned 
Iran’s flag (specifically described to respondents as “the flag of the Islamic Republic”) were also 
viewed without sympathy, with 63% asking for harsh punishment and another 30% for 
prosecutions with lesser penalties (should release, 4%). 
 
Respondents’ general attitude toward political violence was made clear by a separate question 
that asked whether they agreed with the complaint that “the government should be more forceful 
to stop rioters who use violence or damage property.” Sixty-three percent agreed strongly and 
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I will now read you some categories of people who 
were arrested. Please tell whether in general you 
think most of them should be:
Peaceful protestors who were chanting slogans 
against government policies
Peaceful protestors who were chanting slogans 
against Iran’s political system 




11. Media Consumption Habits 
 
Majorities follow news regarding domestic and international affairs. Domestic television, 
followed by social networking apps, such as Telegram, and the internet are the media used 
by a majority of Iranians to become informed about the news. The numbers of people 
relying on VOA and BBC news programs have declined significantly since the rise of social 
media in Iran.   
 
While majorities of Iranians follow both domestic and international affairs, the majority 
following domestic affairs is larger—as is true in many other countries. When asked how much 
they follow news regarding domestic affairs, seven in ten (70%) said they follow this news at 
least somewhat; a fifth (19%) said they follow it a lot. Fifty-five percent said they followed news 
on international affairs, with 12% saying they follow it a lot. 
 
Respondents were asked about 
how much they used seven 
different varieties of news media.  
The two most widespread news 
sources were domestic Iranian TV 
(36%, a lot; 47%, somewhat) and 
“social networking applications 
like Telegram and Instagram” 
(32%, a lot; 34%, somewhat). The 
internet in general came next, with 
29% using it a lot and 29% 
somewhat. While a quarter (26%) 
said they used satellite television 
channels at least somewhat, foreign 
radio channels have a smaller 
following (8%, at least somewhat).  
 
Comparing these responses to 
those gathered in May 2015 when 
we asked similar questions about different types of media sources demonstrates a clear shift in 
media consumption habits. Internet use is now much more widespread than it was in 2015, when 
only 34% said they used it to become informed about the news at least once a week. Domestic 
and satellite television consumption have declined. In 2015, 71% said they watched domestic 
television daily and another 20 percent at least once a week, while 17% watched satellite 
television daily and 10% once a week. 
 
Since August 2015, we’ve asked respondents whether they follow the news programs of BBC or 
the Voice of America. Between 25% and 32% of respondents have consistently answered yes, 
but the number of viewers has dipped recently. In the current survey, 23% said they followed 
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To what degree do you use each of the following media to 
get news about domestic and international affairs?









While respondents who reported they followed news programs on the BBC or Voice of America 
were, as expected, more critical of government positions than those who did not follow these 
programs, these two groups’ views were not polarized. The majority view in one group was not 
opposed to the majority view in the other group. Rather, the differences between them tended to 
remain within a 15-to-20-point range. Here are characteristic examples: 
 
• Forty-four percent of those who follow BBC/VOA believed “Iran’s current level of 
involvement in Iraq and Syria is not in Iran’s national interests,” compared to 29% of those 
who do not.   
• Forty-seven percent of those following BBC/VOA agreed that “the government should spend 
less money in places like Syria and Iraq,” compared to 40% of those who do not.       
• About half (49%) who follow BBC/VOA thought “the government should not be strict in 
enforcing Islamic laws,” compared to 33% among those who do not.   
• Over a third (36%) of those who follow BBC/VOA thought “the government interferes too 
much in people’s personal lives,” compared to 24% of those who do not. 
 
 
12. A Range of Views on Regional Issues 
 
About half of Iranians say their government should try to find mutually acceptable 
solutions to regional problems, and the other half say that Iran should seek to become the 
most powerful country in the region. A large majority says Iran should either increase or 
maintain its current level of support for groups fighting terrorist groups like ISIS. Most 
Iranians want Iran to use its influence in Iraq to support policies that benefit both Shiites 
and Sunnis, rather than policies that primarily benefit Shiites. Now that Iran and Russia 
have declared victory over ISIS in Syria, almost as many Iranians want to end or reduce 
assistance to President Bashar Assad as want to continue it until his government regains 
full control over all Syrian territory. An overwhelming majority reject the idea that Assad 
should not be allowed to remain as Syria’s president and say the Syrian people should 
decide whether he remains in office. 
 
When asked what they think is a better 
approach to regional problems as a general 
rule, about half (49%) preferred “seeking to 
find mutually acceptable solutions with 
other countries through negotiations,” 
while 46% preferred “seeking to become 
the most powerful country in the region.” 
There is also division among respondents 
regarding Iran’s future military efforts in 




















As a general rule, what do you think is the 
better approach for Iran to pursue in trying 




ISIS. The principle of combating 
ISIS evokes a large consensus. 
Almost all (87%) thought that Iran 
should either increase its support 
of groups fighting terrorist groups 
like ISIS (55%) or maintain it at 
the current level (32%). Only 10% 
thought the time has come to 
decrease this support. 
 
Iraq. There is a similarly large 
consensus about whether Iran 
should use its influence in Iraq to 
“primarily benefit [Iraq’s] Shia 
leaders and citizens.” Over three 
in four (78%) rejected this 
approach, saying instead that Iran should “support policies that equally benefit both Shiites and 
Sunnis.”  Only 14% wanted to give Iraqi Shia preferential treatment.  
 
Syria. In November 2017, both 
Iran and Russia declared that the 
campaign in Syria to defeat ISIS 
had succeeded. Respondents were 
reminded of this and asked 
whether Iran should now end its 
military assistance to the 
government of Bashar Assad, 
reduce such assistance, or 
“continue [it] until Assad’s 
government gains full control 
over all Syrian territories.” Half 
(49%), but not a majority, wanted 
to continue aiding Assad’s 
government until full control is attained. Three in ten (30%) wanted to reduce assistance; 15% 
wanted to end it. 
 
Respondents were offered two arguments about whether Assad should remain president of Syria: 
 
Some people say that going forward, Bashar Assad should not be allowed to remain President of Syria because 
he is an incompetent leader who used excessive force against Syrian civilians and let ISIS gain control of 
territory. Others say that Bashar Assad did what was necessary to keep Syria together and whether he remains 
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Mar. 2016 Jun.2016 Dec.2016 Jun.2017 Jan.2018
Increase it Decrease it Maintain it at current level
In your opinion should Iran increase its support of 
groups fighting terrorist groups like ISIS, decrease 
it, or maintain it at the current level? 
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Between these two arguments, more 
than four in five chose the second: 
84% said the Syrian people should 
decide whether Assad should 
remain president, while 9% said this 
should not be allowed.  
 
Yemen. There is not currently 
majority support for fuller Iranian 
involvement in Yemen. Iran’s 
official position is that it supports 
the Houthi opposition politically, 
but not in any other way. When 
respondents were asked whether “Iran should help the Houthis defeat their opponents,” a little 
under half (47%) thought that it should, while 41% said “Iran should not get involved in 
Yemen’s domestic conflict.” Twelve percent did not select either alternative. 
 
There is not a clear Iranian majority expressing favorable feelings toward the Houthis. Half 
(50%) said they were favorable toward them (very, 27%), while 38% were unfavorable (very, 
23%). As with the question on what Iran should do in Yemen, 12% did not answer. 
 
Hezbollah of Lebanon. Hezbollah, which is generally seen favorably by the Iranian public, 
showed a slight decline in popularity in this survey. Sixty-five percent said they had a favorable 
view of Hezbollah (35%, very). This is down from 73 percent in June 2016, though the number 
who are very favorable has remained stable. 
 
 
13. General Soleimani’s Popularity Soars, while Rouhani and Zarif Slip 
 
General Qasem Soleimani’s popularity is at an all-time high, with two in three saying that 
they hold a very favorable opinion of him. He is followed in popularity by the Iranian 
Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, whose favorability rating has decreased slightly 
since June 2017. President Rouhani’s popularity has dropped sharply since his victory in 
the May 2017 presidential elections.  Opinions of Ebrahim Raisi, Rouhani’s conservative 
opponent in the election, have held steady. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s former 
president, remains the most polarizing figure among Iranian politicians. 
 
General Soleimani’s profile has risen, especially on the heels of his November 2017 
announcement of ISIS’ defeat, after the group lost its last urban stronghold in eastern Syria. 
Eighty-three percent viewed him favorably—nearly two thirds (65%), very favorably. His 
favorability ratings have risen from 74% in May 2017 and 78% in June 2017. 
 
The second most popular figure named in the survey is Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, viewed 
favorably by two thirds (68%; 36%, very). This represents an 8-point decline from June 2017, 






















Which view is closer to your perspective?
Iranian	Public	Opinion	After	the	Protests																																																			 33	
	
President Rouhani’s popularity has 
dropped sharply since his victory in last 
year’s presidential election.  Two thirds 
(66%) viewed him favorably in 
January, but only  24% were very 
favorable. While down 10 points from 
June 2017, this is similar to results 
during the hotly contested election, 
when his favorability rating was 65%, 
with 27% very favorable. From January 
2016 to January 2018 Rouhani’s rating 
fell 16 points (“very favorable,” down 
18 points).  (IranPoll asked this 
question again in April and found a 
further drop, to 59% favorable.) 
 
Opinions of Ebrahim Raisi, Rouhani’s 
conservative opponent in the elections, 
have remained roughly constant. A 
54% majority is favorable toward him 
(very, 19%), similar to his 57% rating 
in June 2017. 
 
Opinions of ex-president Ahmadinejad 
are notably polarized.  In general, 
Iranian respondents tend not to give 
sharply negative ratings to politicians, 
but 48% viewed Ahmadinejad 
unfavorably and 47% favorably—his 





14. Majority Sees Climate Change as a Very Serious Problem 
 
Iranians almost unanimously see global climate change as a serious issue and a majority 
says these changes are harming people around the world today. Two in three say they are 
very concerned that climate change will affect them personally. A large majority wants the 
government to do more to protect the environment, even if the economy suffers as a result. 
Two in three say they approve of Iran taking steps to significantly reduce its air pollution 
over the next 15 years, even if it leads to higher prices and unemployment rates in the short 
term.  
 
This study asked questions about climate change that have been asked in many other countries.  
When asked how serious a problem global climate change is, three quarters (73%) said it was 
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very serious and another 21% said it was somewhat serious. Viewed in comparison to Pew 
Research Center’s international polling, Iran was similar to India and much of Latin America in 
its level of concern, and slightly stronger than Western Europe and Canada.1 The median of 
Pew’s 40 countries was 54%. 
 
Three in five Iranians (59%) think climate change “is harming people around the world now.”  
Another third (34%) think this will occur “in the next few years.” Only 4% think it is less urgent. 
Again, comparing to Pew data, this is similar to France (59%, harming now), Spain (61%, now), 
and Canada (56%, now), but lower than Japan (71%, now) or Brazil (90%, now). The median of 
Pew’s 40 countries was 51%. 
 
Almost two thirds of Iranians are very concerned that they will be personally harmed by climate 
change in their lifetimes, and another 28% are somewhat concerned. Pew data suggests Iranian 
attitudes are most similar to India (69%, very concerned), Vietnam (60%), Kenya (61%), and 
Nigeria (63%). These responses are all in sharp contrast with North American and European 
attitudes. The median of Pew’s 40 countries was 40% very concerned. 
 
Offered two statements, two thirds 
(67%) of Iranians said that the 
government should “put a higher 
priority on protecting the 
environment, even if the economy 
suffers to some extent,” while only 
23% chose “put a higher priority 
on economic growth, even if the 
environment suffers to some 
extent.” For comparison, a 2014 
CBS/New York Times study asked 
Americans the same question and 
58% said the emphasis should go 
to the environment while 37% 
wanted it on the economy. 
 
Iranian respondents were asked about the Paris agreement on climate change, which is not a 
familiar topic in Iran. Told that “Iran and most other countries around the world made an 
agreement to cut their air pollution in order to reduce climate change,” only 24% said they had 
heard of the agreement before (75%, no). The phrase “air pollution” was used to designate the 
types of changes that Iran has agreed to in order to achieve a cleaner energy profile. This is 
language that most Iranians know and understand to include some economic costs. Respondents 
were then asked about Iran’s contribution, offered in Paris, in terms that clarified that these 
commitments carry economic risks for Iran: 
 
As part of this agreement, Iran has promised to significantly reduce its air pollution over the next 15 years if it 
gets some financial assistance to develop cleaner technology. These steps, however, have costs and may 
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taking these steps because it will lead to better air quality in Iran and will reduce global climate change. Other 
people say that Iran should not have made this commitment because efforts to reduce air pollution will hurt 
Iran’s economy and only the wealthier countries who have caused most of the climate change should be 
required to take such steps. To what degree do you approve or disapprove of Iran taking these steps? 
 







Appendix: Detailed Methodology 
 
This study is based on a telephone poll (CATI) conducted between January 16 and 24, 2018 
among a representative sample of 1,002 Iranians. The margin of error is +/- 3.1%.  
 
All interviews were administered in Farsi. When the respondent could not answer in Farsi, an 
interviewer fluent in the respondent’s language was used. In those cases, while the interviews 
were administered in Farsi, the interviewees were able to respond back in their local language. 
The interview was ended in the very rare cases were the respondent could not understand Farsi. 
All interviews were monitored in real-time by call-center supervisors.   
 
RDD samples drawn from all landline telephones in Iran were stratified first by Iranian provinces 
and then according to settlement size and type. All 31 Iranian provinces were represented in 




(% of Population) 
Achieved Sample 
(% of Sample) Difference 
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
East Azerbaijan 3.5 1.4 3.5 1.4 0.0 0.0 
West Azerbaijan 2.7 1.4 2.5 1.2 -0.2 -0.2 
Ardabil 1.1 0.5 1.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 
Esfahan 5.6 0.8 5.8 0.8 0.1 0.0 
Alborz 3.1 0.2 3.2 0.2 0.0 -0.1 
Ilam 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Bushehr 1.0 0.4 1.3 0.4 0.3 0.0 
Tehran 15.6 1.0 15.4 1.0 -0.2 0.0 
Chahar Mahal va Bakhtiari 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.5 -0.1 0.1 
South Khorasan 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.0 -0.1 
Razavi Khorasan 5.9 2.2 5.8 2.2 -0.1 0.0 
North Khorasan 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 
Khuzestan 4.4 1.4 4.6 1.3 0.1 -0.1 
Zanjan 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.4 -0.1 0.0 
Semnan 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Sistan va Baluchestan 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.4 0.0 -0.4 
Fars 4.3 1.8 4.3 1.8 0.0 0.0 
Qazvin 1.2 0.4 1.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 
Qom 1.5 0.1 1.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Kordestan 1.4 0.6 1.4 1.2 0.0 0.6 
Kerman 2.3 1.6 2.3 2.0 0.0 0.4 
Kermanshah 1.8 0.6 1.9 0.0 0.1 -0.6 
Kohgiluyeh va Bowyer 
Ahmad 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 
Golestan 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.0 0.1 -0.1 
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Gilan 2.0 1.2 2.3 1.1 0.3 -0.1 
Lorestan 1.4 0.8 1.4 0.9 0.0 0.1 
Mazandaran 2.4 1.7 2.4 2.0 0.0 0.3 
Markazi 1.4 0.4 1.3 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 
Hormozgan 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.0 0.0 
Hamadan 1.4 0.8 1.4 0.8 0.0 0.0 
Yazd 1.2 0.2 1.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 
 Total 74.0 26.0 74.4 25.6 0.3 -0.3 
 
When a household was reached, an adult was selected using the random table technique. An 
initial attempt and three callbacks were made in an effort to complete an interview with the 
selected respondent. The AAPOR2 contact rate of the survey was 76%. The AAPOR2 
cooperation rate of was 79%. The overall response rate based on AAPOR2 was 58%.  
 
Using AAPOR’s Ninth Edition of Standard Definitions2, the outcome rates of the survey were: 
 
Description Frequency 
I=Complete Interviews (1.1) 1002 
P=Partial Interviews (1.2) 342 
R=Refusal and break off (2.1) 320 
NC=Non-Contact (2.2) 361 
O=Other (2.0, 2.3) 39 
UH=Unknown Household (3.1) 217 
UO=Unknown other (3.2-3.9) 41 
Not eligible (Category 4) 904 
e: (Proportion of eligible units among all units in the sample for 
which a definitive determination of status was obtained)                                              0.695
 
 Response Rate   
Response Rate 1   
     I/(I+P) + (R+NC+O) + (UH+UO) 0.432 
Response Rate 2  
     (I+P)/(I+P) + (R+NC+O) + (UH+UO) 0.579 
Response Rate 3  
     I/((I+P) + (R+NC+O) + e(UH+UO) ) 0.447 
Response Rate 4  







 Cooperation Rate   
Cooperation Rate 1   
     I/(I+P)+R+O) 0.588 
Cooperation Rate 2  
     (I+P)/((I+P)+R+O)) 0.789 
Cooperation Rate 3  
     I/((I+P)+R)) 0.602 
Cooperation Rate 4  
    (I+P)/((I+P)+R)) 0.808 
 
 Refusal Rate   
Refusal Rate 1   
     R/((I+P)+(R+NC+O) + UH + UO)) 0.138 
Refusal Rate 2  
     R/((I+P)+(R+NC+O) + e(UH + UO)) 0.143 
Refusal Rate 3  
     R/((I+P)+(R+NC+O)) 0.155 
 
 Contact Rate   
Contact Rate 1   
     (I+P)+R+O / (I+P)+R+O+NC+ (UH + UO) 0.733 
Contact Rate 2  
     (I+P)+R+O / (I+P)+R+O+NC + e(UH+UO) 0.759 
Contact Rate 3  
     (I+P)+R+O / (I+P)+R+O+NC 0.825 
 
Data Quality Controls 
The quality of the survey data collected by IranPoll was evaluated in several ways. 
 
Comparison with official data: In general, there is a close match between the figures of this 
survey and the most recent official census conducted by the Statistical Center of Iran in 2016. 
 
Sex: 
 Sample Census Difference 
Male 50.5 50.7 -0.2 









 Sample Census  
(% of 18+) 
Difference 
18 – 24 16.2 14.9 +1.3 
25 – 34 25.7 29.2 -3.5 
35 – 44 26.5 21.9 +4.6 
45 – 54 16.8 15.2 +1.6 
55 – 64 9.0 10.3 -1.3 
65+ 5.8 8.5 -2.7 
 
Ethnicity: 
 Sample CIA Factbook Difference 
Persian 49 
61 -4 Mazani/Gilak/Shomali 8 
Turk/Azeri 21 18 3 
Kurd 9 10 -1 
Lur 7 6 1 
Arab 1 2 -1 
Baluch 2 2 0 
Other 3 1 2 
 
Comparison with other credible sources:  There was a close match between percentage of 
respondents who say they follow the news programs of BBC Persian and the viewership 
estimates provided by BBC Persian itself:  
 






 % Approx. 
Population 
equivalent 
Yes 22.5 12.4 million 12 million 
No 77.5   
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There was a close match between the self-reported vote and turnout in Iran's 2017 presidential 
election of the respondents and those released by Iran's Ministry of Interior. In this survey, as in 
most election related survey in other countries, we do see the tendency for the survey results to 
show a higher turnout and lower vote for the losing candidate than the actual outcome:  
 
Voted in the 2017 presidential election: 
 Sample Official Results Difference 
Yes 76.7 73.3 +3.4 
No 22.9 
26.7 -3.4 Don't know / Refused  .4 
 
Who did you vote for in the 2017 presidential election? 
 Sample Official Results Difference 
Rouhani 56.6 57.1 -0.5 
Raisi 27.0 38.3 -11.3 
Mirsalim 1.7 1.2 +0.5 
Hashemitaba .9 .5 +0.4 
Don't know / Refused / Other 13.8 2.9 +10.9 
 
Percent Match Technique for data falsification detection: Kuriakose & Robbins' "Percent 
Match" technique is grounded in a tested assertion that in a 100+ variable survey of more than 
100 respondents, fewer than 5% of respondents should provide identical answers on more than 
85% of the questions. 3  Our survey included 109 variables and had 1,002 respondents.  
 
The following result was obtained when the Percent Match technique was applied: 
Percent Match Number of Respondents Percent of Respondents 
42.0% 1 0.1% 
43.8% 1 0.1% 
44.6% 3 0.3% 
45.5% 1 0.1% 
46.4% 5 0.5% 
47.3% 3 0.3% 
48.2% 14 1.4% 
49.1% 12 1.2% 
50.0% 12 1.2% 
50.9% 16 1.6% 






52.7% 30 3.0% 
53.6% 40 4.0% 
54.5% 28 2.8% 
55.4% 62 6.2% 
56.3% 55 5.5% 
57.1% 68 6.8% 
58.0% 81 8.1% 
58.9% 58 5.8% 
59.8% 84 8.4% 
60.7% 47 4.7% 
61.6% 48 4.8% 
62.5% 61 6.1% 
63.4% 42 4.2% 
64.3% 45 4.5% 
65.2% 28 2.8% 
66.1% 24 2.4% 
67.0% 36 3.6% 
67.9% 31 3.1% 
68.8% 9 0.9% 
69.6% 9 0.9% 
70.5% 9 0.9% 
71.4% 3 0.3% 
72.3% 3 0.3% 
75.0% 4 0.4% 
Total 1002  
 
The Percent Match technique showed no evidence of data fabrication in this survey. The 
outcome was a normal distribution. There were zero interviews with a maximum percent match 





Interview length analysis: In another attempt to check for falsification and other irregularities, 
we compared the length of each interview and the time each respondent took to answer each 
question and compared it to the average interview length and question answer time. We were 
looking for patterns and anomalies that might indicate respondents were giving rapid rote 
answers or struggling to understand the questions. This exercise did not expose any particular 
irregularity.   
 
As expected, no interview took less than 25 minutes to complete. Most respondents answered 
individual questions and completed the full survey in about the average length of time.  Longer 
interviews correlated with factors such as age, education, language barriers, and place of 
residence of the respondents, such that respondents who were older, less educated, spoke a 
language other than Farsi at home, and/or lived in rural areas took longer to answer each 




Sensitive Question Analysis. To assess the likelihood that respondents held back their own true 
opinions and, instead, provided answers in line with positions articulated in Iranian state-owned 
news media, CISSM assessed what proportion of the sample consistently provided responses to 
politically sensitive questions that were in line with the stated positions of the Iranian 
government. Only 1.9% of the respondents provided answers that are systematically and fully in 
line with stated positions of the Iranian government. Almost everyone (98.1%) gave at least one 
response that is directly at odds with positions articulated in Iranian state-owned news media. 
 
Predictive power of polls from Iran: Scientific polls have proven to have a high predictive 
power in Iran. Just as an example, IranPoll, the independent Toronto-based polling company that 
collected data for this survey, was able to predict the outcome of Iran's 2017 presidential election 
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in an interview with the Economist4 three days before the election. IranPoll's projection was less 
than 2 percentage points away from the declared official outcome: 
 
 
																																								 																				
4	https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2017/05/19/what-to-expect-in-irans-presidential-election-today		
